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I. STATEMENT OJ<' THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Patsy Wernecke ("Ms. Wernecke") appeals from the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling dated January 19, 2007. R. pp. 109-
127. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Wernecke filed a worker's compensation complaint against Idaho Special 
Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") on April 26, 2006. On May 18, 2006, ISIF filed a Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Pursuant to J.R.P. 15 seeking dismissal of the complaint. R. pp.1-4, 26. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") granted ISIF' s Petition by its Order on 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, filed January 19, 2007. R. pp. 109-127. Ms. Wernecke filed 
her Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court on August 30, 2007, following the 
Commission's final order entered July 20, 2007, dismissing with prejudice her underlying 
action against the employer and surety. R. pp. 139-141. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Ms. Wernecke suffered her first industrial injury on June 28, 1990 ("1990 injury") 
while employed as a nurse's aide. R. p. 70. The injury led to a cervical spine fusion. After 
reaching medical stability, Ms. Wernecke underwent two evaluations, both concluding that 
despite her injury she remained capable of light work. R. p. 70, pp. 55-69. Following the 
first evaluation, David Ashbaugh, M.D. of the University of Washington Harborview 
Medical Center determined that Ms. Wernecke "should be able to work at employment that 
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does not involve heavy lifting and use of her arms over her head for long periods." R. p. 56. 
Drs. Alan Alyea and Mark Holmes later concluded that Ms. Wernecke was "capable of 
gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis" but that she should avoid lifting over 
thirty pounds and should avoid working overhead. R. p. 67. 
As a result of the 1990 injury, the surety, State Insurance Fund, paid Ms. Wernecke 
benefits for permanent physical impairment of 16% whole person. Claiming additional 
benefits, Ms. Wernecke filed worker's compensation complaints against both State Insurance 
Fund and ISIF, ultimately settling her claim against State Insurance Fund for $30,000, which 
included benefits for disability above impairment of24.5% whole person. R. pp. 69-78. 
Ms. Wernecke also settled her claim against ISIF for a lump sum payment of $6,500. 
In the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"), R. pp. 79-86, ISIF both denied that 
Ms. Wernecke was permanently and totally disabled and sought to avoid liability for 
payment of any subsequent claim for disability that might arise from a future injury. 
Specifically, the Agreement recites that "Claimant contends, and the Fund [ISIFJ denies, that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and that the Fund is liable 
for a portion of the Claimant's disability due to pre-existing conditions." R. p. 80. (emphasis 
added). The Agreement further provides that the lump sum payment of $6,500 "is in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims the claimant may now or hereafter 
have ... and all other claims that claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits against 
the Fund under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. This is the case ... 
whether the claimant shall ever again injure herself in another or future accident .... " 
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(emphasis added). R. p. 82. Finally, the Agreement provides that Ms. Wernecke's 
acceptance of its terms "shall fully and completely discharge the Fund's liability for any 
claims forever regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the subject 
of this cause or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or deformities 
existing prior thereto or hereafter arising." R. pp. 82-83. (emphasis added). 
Ms. Wernecke signed the Agreement and the Industrial Commission approved it. She 
was represented by an attorney. 
Ms. Wernecke returned to work as a custodian within the restrictions stated by 
Drs. Ashbaugh, Alyea and Holmes and was re-injured on October 8, 2002 ("2002 injury"). 
R. p. 129. She filed complaints against the ISIP asserting total and permanent disability, and 
against State Insurance Fund, the employer's surety at the time of the 2002 injury. She 
settled her claim against State Insurance Fund by lump sum agreement. R. pp. 128-138. 
ISIP, however, contended that the Agreement barred any further recovery from ISIP and 
filed its Petition for Declaratory Ruling Pursuant to J.R.P. 15. R. pp. 1-4. The Commission 
granted ISIF's Petition, finding the Agreement valid and further holding that Ms. Wernecke's 
second claim against ISIP was barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and 
quasi-estoppel, and that she had waived her right to pursue another claim against ISIP. R. pp. 
112 121. Ms. Wernecke appealed the Industrial Commission's Order granting the Petition. 
R. pp. 142-144. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Is a lump sum settlement agreement between a worker's compensation 
claimant and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund invalid as a waiver of rights to 
compensation under the worker's compensation law when the ISIF denies that the 
claimant is totally and permanently disabled, the agreement does not compensate the 
claimant for total and permanent disability, and it bars the claimant from recovery 
against ISIF for disability arising out of future injuries? 
B. Did the Industrial Commission err in its determination that the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Ms. Wernecke's claim against ISIF? 
C. Did the Industrial Commission err when it concluded that Ms. Wernecke's 
claim against ISIF is barred by quasi-estoppel and waiver? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804,807, 134 P.3d 
655, 658 (2006). Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues 
adjudicated in prior litigation between the parties is likewise a question of law subject to free 
review. Smith v. US.R. V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 798, 118 P.3d 127, 131 (2005). 
Finally, the interpretation and legal effect of a contract are questions of law and the Court 
therefore also exercises free review. First Sec. Bank, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 791, 
964 P.2d 654, 658 (1998). See also City of Boise City v. Keep the Commandments Coalition, 
143 Idaho 254,256, 141 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2006) ("The standard of review for questions of 
law is one of free review.") 
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B. The Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF is invalid under Idaho Code 
§ 72-318(2) because it is an agreement to waive her rights to compensation under the 
Worker's Compensation Act, and it violates Idaho Code§§ 72-332 and 72-324 because 
it doesn't compensate her for total and permanent disability. 
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide "sure and certain relief 
for injured workers and their families and dependents." Idaho Code§ 72-201 (1971); Davaz 
v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (I 994). In line with this 
fundamental purpose, the Act must be "liberally construed in favor of the claimant in order to 
effect the object of the law and to promote justice." Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 
633,115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005). Neither the Court nor the Commission can "deprive the 
statute of its potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337. 
Consistent with the overriding objective to protect injured workers and promote 
justice, the legislature enacted Idaho Code§ 72-318. This statute prohibits employers from 
requiring employees to pay any portion of the employer's worker's compensation premium, 
to contribute in any way to the cost or other security maintained by the employer for the 
purpose of securing payment of worker's compensation benefits, to contribute to a benefit 
fund, or to use contracts, rules, regulations or other devices designed to relieve the employer 
from liability created by the worker's compensation statutes. An employer who deducts any 
amount from an employee's pay for any of these purposes is guilty of a misdemeanor. Idaho 
Code§ 72-318(1). The statute goes further, however, and prohibits all agreements, not just 
contracts with employers, which attempt to deny or diminish an employee's right to benefits. 
"No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this Act shall be 
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valid." Idaho Code§ 72-318(2) (emphasis added). 1 
The question here is whether the Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF 
constitutes an invalid agreement to waive her rights to full compensation from the ISIF in the 
event of total and permanent disability arising from a future injury. 
1. The Agreement is an invalid agreement to waive rights to 
compensation. 
By its terms, the Agreement relieves ISIF from any obligation to Ms. Wernecke on 
account of any future injury or subsequent disability. Paragraph SEVENTH of the 
Agreement states in full: 
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the lump 
sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be paid to Claimant by the Fund is in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that Claimant may now 
or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature 
or kind for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary 
disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and all other 
claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits against the 
Fund under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State ofldaho. This is 
the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, 
expenses or claims are now known or foreseen and regardless of whether the 
Claimant shall ever again injure herself in another or future accident, or 
suffer any disease which would arguably cause the Fund to be liable for 
1 The Industrial Commission, in its Order at R. p. l 13, appears to view§ 72-318(2) as 
applying only to employers. If this were true, subsection (2) would be duplicative of 
subsection (1), which expressly prohibits contracts between an employer and its employee 
designed to relieve the employer from any liability under the worker's compensation statutes. 
It would be mere surplusage. This could not have been the legislature's intent, and this Court 
should not "construe a statute in a way that makes mere surplusage of provisions included 
therein." Ag. Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 67, 44 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2002). 
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additional claims or benefits under the Jaws of the State ofidaho. Acceptance 
of this Agreement by the Claimant according to the terms and conditions 
stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge the Fund from liability 
from any claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the 
accident which is the subject of this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, 
impairments, disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter 
arising 
R. pp. 82-83 (emphasis added). 
ISIF asserted as the crux of its Petition for Declaratory Ruling that by signing 
the Agreement, Ms. Wernecke "released ISIF from liability for any and all claims, 
even if Claimant injured herself again in the future." R. p. 18 (emphasis added). In 
so doing, ISIF both acknowledged Ms. Werneck:e's attempt to waive her right to seek 
benefits from ISIF arising from a future injury, and depended on this waiver in 
asserting that it could have no further liability. R. pp. 24-25. But it is precisely 
because the Agreement forecloses any claim against ISIF arising out of a future injury 
that it is invalid under Idaho Code§ 72-318(2). 
The only case in which this Court has considered the effect ofidaho Code § 72-
318(2) is Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005), where the Court 
addressed the Industrial Commission's authority to approve a stipulation by the employer and 
employee to dismiss a worker's compensation claim with prejudice under Idaho Code§ 72-
508. The claimant contended that the stipulation amounted to an invalid agreement to waive 
his rights to compensation under Idaho Code § 72-318(2). This Court disagreed: 
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Emery was not waiving his rights to compensation under the act. He 
stipulated to dismiss his claim with respect to the injury he suffered on March 
10, 2001. The stipulation did not relieve Simplot of liability for any injury he 
might suffer in the future while employed by Simplot. 
141 Idaho at 410 (emphasis added). Because Emery did not waive compensation for a future 
injury, the Court concluded that the stipulation was valid under§ 72-318(2). 
The Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF is different. Its specific purpose is 
to relieve ISIF of liability stemming from any injury Ms. Wernecke might suffer in the 
future, and it is expressly not limited to ISIF's liability arising out of the June 28, 1990 
accident. It therefore violates § 72-318(2). 
ISIF argued below, and the Commission evidently agreed, that "there is no statutory 
language in the worker's compensation law or prior Idaho case law preventing parties to a 
worker's compensation suit from entering into settlement agreements barring a claimant from 
asserting any future claims against a defendant." R. p. 25. ISIF and the Commission are 
simply wrong. While a claimant can clearly compromise a claim arising out of a past injury 
and agree not to claim further benefits related to that injury (the Emery facts), § 72-318(2) 
does not permit her to relinquish or waive her right to claim compensation arising out of a 
future injury. Ms. Wemecke's attempt to do exactly this renders her prior lump sum 
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settlement agreement with ISIP invalid. 2 
2. The Agreement did not compensate Ms. Wernecke for total and 
permanent disability and therefore violates Idaho Code § 72-332. 
Ms. Wernecke has a right under Idaho Code§ 72-332(1) to compensation from ISIP 
arising out of her October 8, 2002 injury if she can prove that she is now permanently and 
totally disabled. In order to recover, she must show only that she is "an employee who has a 
permanent physical impairment" who has "incur[red] a subsequent disability by an injury 
arising out of and in the course of her employment, and by reason of both the combined 
effects of the pre-existing impairment and subsequent injury" that she has suffered total and 
permanent disability. Idaho Code§ 72-332(1). The employer and surety are liable only for 
payment of compensation benefits for the disability caused by her most recent injury. ISIP's 
obligation to pay the balance of benefits for total and permanent msability is mandatory: Ms. 
Wernecke "shall be compensated for the remainder of [her] income benefits out of the 
Industrial Special Indemnity Account." Id. ( emphasis added). 
2 This Court has not considered whether an agreement in violation of§ 72-318(2) is void or 
voidable. Statutes in other states having similar or identical statutory provisions indicate 
such agreements are void. See e.g. N.D. Cent. Code,§ 65-01-10 (2007) (heading of nearly 
identical statuto1y provision states, "Waiver ofrights to compensation void .... "; A.R.S 
[Arizona}§ 23-1025 (2007) (similar statutory provision stating that an agreement by an 
employee to waive the employee's rights to compensation is void); Tex. Lab. Code§ 406.035 
(2007) (nearly identical statutory provision states "An agreement by an employee to waive 
the employee's right to compensation is void"); N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 97-21 (2007) (heading of 
nearly identical statutory provision states "Agreement of employee to contribute to premium 
or waive right to compensation void"); R.1. Gen. Laws§ 28-33-26 (2007) (heading to similar 
statute states "Waivers of compensation void.") 
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ISIF cannot avoid the mandate of§ 72-332(1) by relying on a lump sum agreement 
under which it paid a de minimus amount for a waiver of all future claims arising from future 
injuries. ISIF has not compensated Ms. Wernecke for total and permanent disability - for 
"the remainder of her income benefits" - and the Agreement cannot be permitted to nullify or 
limit the operation ofldaho Code § 72-332. To do so would clearly "deprive the statute of its 
potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337. 
3. ISIF has no authority to enter into lump sum agreements settling 
claims where it denies that the claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
ISIF was created by Idaho Code§ 72-323. In§ 72-324, ISIF's manager is granted 
power to administer the fund, including the power to "make agreements, subject to the 
approval of the Industrial Commission,for compensation for injuries and occupational 
diseases in accordance with the provisions of this act." Idaho Code§ 72-324 (emphasis 
added). While the statute doesn't specify whether the manager's power to make agreements 
for compensation for injuries applies only to past injuries, it doesn't have to because another 
"provision of this act,"§ 72-318(2), precludes agreements affecting compensation for future 
injuries. The manager's power can therefore only extend to agreements compensating for 
past injuries. Section 72-324 does not authorize ISIF to enter into, nor does it authorize the 
Industrial Commission to approve, a lump sum payment abrogating ISIF's liability for total 
and permanent disability under§ 72-332. Neither§ 72-404 nor§ 72-711 is to the contrary. 
Section 72-404 provides for a lump sum payment whenever the Commission 
determines that it is for the best interest of all parties that "the liability of the employer for 
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compensation ... be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or more lump sums 
to be determined, with the approval of the commission." Idaho Code § 72-404 ( emphasis 
added). 
There is no conflict between§ 72-404 and§ 72-318(2). First,§ 72-404 can only 
apply to lump sum compensation for past injuries, for the reasons stated above. Moreover, 
"employer" is defined in Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) as "any person who has expressly or 
impliedly hired or contracted the services of another." ISIF is not an employer; it did not 
expressly or impliedly hire Ms. Wernecke. It is therefore not authorized under§ 72-404 to 
discharge its liability to Ms. Wernecke by lump sum payment. 
In§ 72-711, relating to compensation agreements, the legislature likewise provided 
that "if the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to 
compensation under this law" a memorandum of the agreement is to be filed with the 
Commission and becomes enforceable under the provisions of§ 72-73 5. Such a 
compensation agreement "shall be approved by the commission only when the terms conform 
to the provisions of this law." Idaho Code§ 72-711 (emphasis added). 
Again, ISIF is not an employer. More importantly, the compensation agreement 
between ISIF and Ms. Wernecke doesn't conform to the provisions of the law. It violates 
§ 72-318(2), as set forth above. It also violates ISIF's obligation under§ 72-332 to 
compensate Ms. Wernecke for those income benefits for which the employer and surety are 
not liable. ISIF cannot reasonably argue that the $6,500 it paid to Ms. Wernecke was 
compensation for total and permanent disability. This would be disingenuous. ISIF 
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specifically denied she was totally and permanently disabled and denied liability for any 
portion of her disability due to pre-existing conditions. Moreover, the $6,500 paid under the 
Agreement represented only an additional 7% whole person disability at the time and 
therefore constituted little more than nuisance value consideration for the waiver of Ms. 
Wernecke's right to compensation from ISIP arising out of any future injury. 
ISIF argued below that itis statutorily authorized under Idaho Code§ 72-324 to enter 
into agreements of the kind it made with Ms. Wernecke. While the manager may, and 
routinely does, make agreements, subject to Industrial Commission approval,/or 
compensation for injuries in accordance with the provision of the worker's compensation 
laws, it is not empowered to make agreements which relieve it from liability under§ 72-332. 
It is one thing to enter into an agreement with a claimant whom ISIF acknowledges is totally 
and permanently disabled and that simply provides the method and structure for payment of 
benefits. It is quite another matter, and contrary to law, for ISIF to buy out of its obligation 
under§ 72-332 for a sum that comes nowhere close to compensating the claimant for total 
and permanent disability while at the same time denying the claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled. The Industrial Commission simply had no authority to approve such 
an agreement. 
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C. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Ms. 
Wernecke's claim against ISIF. 
1. Collateral estoppel 
The purposes of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) are to protect litigants from the 
burden of re-litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy, to promote judicial 
economy by preventing needless litigation, to prevent inconsistent decisions, and to 
encourage reliance on adjudications. Maroun v. Wyre/ess Sys., 141 Idaho 604,617, I 14 P.3d 
974, 987 (2005). 
Ms. Wernecke accepts that collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of issues necessarily 
decided in her prior action against ISIF. The question is whether ISIF's liability with regard 
to future injuries was, or was even capable of, being decided. 
The Agreement itself isn't helpful. It simply states that in consideration of the 
Agreement, "all parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be 
deemed to adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Worker's Compensation 
Laws of Idaho." R. p. 81. It further recites that the lump sum payment of $6,500 is "in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that claimant may now or hereafter 
have, including but not limited to ... permanent disability compensation and all other claims 
that claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's 
Compensation Laws of the State of!daho." R. p. 82. 
ISIP nevertheless contended below that the Agreement "conclusively decided" 
whether Ms. Wernecke could ever assert liability against ISIP as to a future injury, R. p. 19, 
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and asserted that Commission approval of the lump sum agreement constituted a final 
judgment on the merits of the claim. Id. It is clear, however, that a future claim for 
compensation fil'ising out of a new injury would necessarily involve a new and separate claim 
with new facts, the merits of which could not possibly be decided by agreement or 
adjudication before the claim ever arose. 
The Agreement, and the Industrial Commission's approval of it, thus cannot 
constitute a final adjudication that Ms. Wernecke was totally and permanently disabled 
following the 1990 injury and that $6,500 fully compensated her for total and permanent 
disability in excess of the impairment and disability paid by State Insurance Fund. To accord 
collateral estoppel effect to the Agreement would be tantamount to finding that Ms. 
Wernecke waived her right to compensation from ISIF to which she might be entitled as a 
result of a future injury, a waiver barred by § 72-318(2). 
The Industrial Commission thus erred in holding that under the collateral estoppel 
doctrine, the Agreement "waived any further claims against ISIF for total and permanent 
disability." R. p. 120. 
2. Res judicata 
Nor can the doctrine ofresjudicata apply. Idaho Code§ 72-718 provides in relevant 
part that "a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive 
as to all matters adjudicated by the Commission ... " Idaho Code § 72-718. This Court has 
held that this statute alters the traditional understanding of res judicata: 
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We conclnde that the legislatnre, by adding the phrase "as to all matters 
adjudicated," intended that decisions of the Commission be final and 
conclusive only as to those matters actually adjudicated. This is a departure 
from the concept of"pure resjudicata," applied prior to 1971, which accorded 
decisions by the Commission finality and conclusiveness as to all matters 
which were, or could have been, adjudicated. Therefore the .... compensation 
agreement is only final and conclusive as to those matters actually considered 
by the Commission. 
Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716,721,682 P.2d 1263 (1984) (emphasis 
added). The Commission made no determination that Ms. Wernecke was totally and 
permanently disabled and ISIF specifically denied that she was. Nor could the 
Commission actually adjudicate Ms. Wernecke' s futnre claims for compensation 
arising out of new injuries. They had not yet occurred. Ms. Wernecke is therefore 
not precluded from now bringing her claims relating to her subsequent 2002 injury. 
D. The common law doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not apply. 
ISIF's common-law waiver defense is addressed above. The Commission's 
conclusion that the common law doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies because it would 
otherwise be unconscionable to allow Ms. Wernecke to maintain that she is entitled to further 
compensation from ISIF is error. 
First, it is not unconscionable to rely on a statute, § 72-318(2), when the statute 
renders the Agreement invalid. There is a purpose to this law. It recognizes that whether by 
economic necessity, coercion, mistake, or ill-advised decision, a claimant may be induced or 
may otherwise attempt to waive her right to worker's compensation benefits. The legislature 
has stated a fundamental policy that such a waiver, for any reason, is invalid. Ms. Wernecke 
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made an ill-advised mistake in entering into the Agreement and the Commission erred in 
approving it. The statute is there to protect her from her mistake and compels the 
Commission to prevent, and this Court to correct, the error. 
Moreover, an important element of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is that the person 
against whom it is invoked must not only assert a right inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by her, but must have "knowledge of the facts and [her] rights." Young v. 
Idaho Dep't of Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,875,853 P.2d 615,620 (Ct. App. 1993). 
ISIF cannot reasonably contend that Ms. Wernecke had lmowledge of the facts of her future 
employment and future injury, yet to occur. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel therefore cannot 
be raised as a bar to her present claim. 
E. To preclude Ms. Wernecke's claim against ISIF is against the public policy of 
the State of Idaho. 
The purpose of ISIF is to relieve employers of impaired or disabled persons of "the 
responsibility of paying for total disability compensation to [employees] rendered totally and 
permanently disabled because of [their] pre-existing handicap coupled with ... subsequent 
industrial injuries." Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197, 200, 439 P.2d 931, 934 
(1968). This policy encourages employers to hire impaired workers by relieving them from 
paying total and permanent disability benefits if the employee is subsequently injured. Id. In 
providing a source of recovery to an impaired worker who returns to employment after 
injury, workers like Ms. Wernecke are encouraged and enabled to continue working and to 
remain productive. This societal good is lost if ISIF can avoid its statutory obligation under 
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§ 72-332 by contracting it away. Equally important, ifISIF is allowed to avoid liability for 
Ms. Wernecke's total and permanent disability by paying her the equivalent ofa 7% 
disability, the burden of her support is placed on the Social Security system and Idaho's 
social services safety net. This is a result the legislature, in establishing ISIF and the 
worker's compensation system as a whole, clearly intended to avoid. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The worker's compensation statutes do not permit a claimant to waive her right to 
compensation for future injuries. This is true whether the waiver is by agreement with an 
employer or surety or with ISIF. ISIP had no authority to enter into the Agreement with Ms. 
Wernecke and the Industrial Commission had no authority to approve it. Ms. Wernecke 
respectfully asks this Court to declare the Agreement invalid and to permit her to proceed 
with her claim against ISIF for total and permanent disability arising out of her 2002 injury. 
Respectfully submitted this / / rt. day of January, 2008. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By:_tider [. /4U-_ 
Charles L. Graham 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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